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CHAPTER y I I 
Autonomy and Human Rights 
Concerns in Post-Handover 
Hong Kong 
Roda Mushkat1 
Whether dictated by self-interest or as a result of a local strategy 
of building trust and cultivating good relations with the Central 
Government, it is commonly accepted that "Beijing has kept a 
decidedly low profile in H o n g Kong."2 A recent study by a new 
U.S. House of Representatives Task Force concluded, "[ t]he 
Chinese Government appears to be taking seriously [China] 
President J iang Zemin's pledge at the handover that no mainland 
government officials 'may or will be allowed to interfere in the 
affairs which H o n g Kong should administer on its own;"' and 
"[f]ar from being heavy-handed or insensitive, Beijing appears to 
have absented itself from active involvement in Hong Kong 
affairs."3 
Yet, it has been suggested that "perhaps the most significant 
threat to the territory's autonomy comes from within."4 Thus, for 
example, while "opinion is divided over the extent to which self-
^Copyright Roda Mushkat 1998. This chapter draws on the author's article, 
The Future of Hong Kong's International Legal Personality: Does International Law 
Matter? A Post-Handover Snapshot, 22 S. ILL U. LJ. 275 (1998). 
2John Ridding, Governing with a Light Touch, FIN. TIMES, December 8, 1997, 
China Supplement, at iv. 
^Quoted in Simon Beck, "So Far, So Good" Transition Verdict, SUNDAY MORNING 
POST, Nov. 11, 1997, at 2. 
4Riddine, supra note 2. 
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censorship5 in the media has increased since the handover,"6 
"elsewhere there have been signs of second-guessing the new sov-
ereign."7 Less ambiguity and more concern exists about the self-
restrictive approach adopted by Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region judges regarding the jurisdictional compe-
tence of the Region's courts in a recent decision on the legality of 
the Provisional Legislature. 
5Self-censorship is widely perceived to exist, but it remains difficult to find 
specific instances in which self-censorship killed a story or suppressed an edito-
rial. The pressure appears to remain more subtle, coming not as a direct order 
to refrain from writing, but as a subjective exercise of special care toward topics 
of particular sensitivity such as China's leadership dynamics, Taiwan, Tibet, or 
military activity. . . . Analysts have also noted that many Chinese-language papers 
that originally criticized the Provisional Legislature changed their position after 
the body became a reality and now support it. This might represent a form of 
self-censorship, or it might reflect a pragmatic approach toward unfolding 
events. U.S. Department of State, United States-Hong Kong Policy Act Report, March 
31, 1997, at 24. 
"Ridding, supra note 2. See also Philip Bowring, What's Changing in Hong 
Kong, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 27, 1997, at 10 (stating that "[although there 
was an evident increase in media self-censorship in the months leading up to the 
handover, the situation has not become worse. Indeed, there are signs of greater 
determination now to exercise old freedoms and test the new limits."). 
'Ridding, supra note 2 (citing as an example the failure of two recent 
Hollywood productions about Tibet to find distributors in Hong Kong). 
Reference could also be made to a case of "over-guessing" the new sovereign, 
involving the attack on Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) by a Hong Kong 
Adviser to China and a long-standing member of the Chinese People Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Xu Ximin, who accused the broadcaster of 
being "a remnant of British rule" in criticizing the SAR government and the 
Chief Executive under the guise of editorial independence. See Margaret Ng, 
Slow Road to Censorship, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at 23 (the author 
views even more gravely comments by the Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, 
implying that some concession has to be made on freedom of speech to accom-
modate the positive presentation of government policies). Ironically, in an 
apparent reprimand to Xu, Li Ruihuan, the mainland chairman of the CPPCC, 
emphasized that RTHK was not a matter of concern for the Central Government 
and that the CPPCC meeting was not a place for discussing the internal affairs 
of Hong Kong. See Xu's Attack on RTHK Dismissed, SUNDAY MORNING POST, March 
8, 1998, at 4. See also President Jiang Zemin's call on local deputies to the 
National People's Congress not to interfere with the affairs of the SAR govern-
ment, as reported in Linda Choy, HK Deputies Warned Not to Meddle, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Mar. 10, 1998, at 1. 
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As stated (in an obiter dicta) by Chief Judge Patrick Chan: 
". . . regional courts have no jurisdiction to query the validity of 
any legislation or acts passed by the Sovereign [although] courts 
do have the jurisdiction to examine the existence (as opposed to 
validity) of the acts of the Sovereign or its delegate."8 These dicta 
might have been generated by the special political circumstances 
surrounding the Provisional Legislature and hence be an isolated 
case. Nonetheless, concerns have been raised regarding the 
precedential implications of an authoritative ruling for the 
Special Administrative Region's high degree of autonomy.9 
8HKSARv. Ma Wai-Kwan, [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761, 780, 781 (Ct. App.) (hold-
ing inter alia that the setting-up of the Provisional Legislative Council by the 
Preparatory Commit tee for the HKSAR was ratified by the National People's 
Congress and that such ratification was a sovereign act that the HKSAR could 
not chal lenge) . T h e court 's rul ing regarding the legality of the Provisional 
Legislature has been challenged in ano ther case (as part of an appeal by child 
migrants to be allowed to remain in the HKSAR, after disputed laws forcing 
them to re turn to the mainland to comply with immigrat ion procedures were 
passed by the Provisional Legislature within days of the handover; see infra notes 
45, 47, 48). In its j u d g m e n t of May 20, 1998, the Court of Appeal held itself 
b o u n d by its decision in Ma Wai-Kwan. T h e Chief J u d g e nonetheless conceded 
that an "analogy with colonial courts [inability to review acts of the British 
Parl iament] . . . might not have been entirely appropriate"; and that "it may be 
that in appropr ia te cases . . . the HKSAR courts do have jurisdict ion to examine 
laws and acts of the NPC which affect the HKSAR for the purpose of, say, deter-
mining whether such laws or acts are contrary to or inconsistent with the Basic 
Law." Chan, Chief J u d g e of the High Court, further stated that "[his] views on 
the court 's jurisdict ion in the David Ma case were expressed in the context of the 
case and canno t be unders tood to mean that NPC laws and acts would prevail 
over the Basic Law." Undoubtedly, as the Chief J u d g e added, "HKSAR courts 
have the jurisdict ion to judicially review the laws passed and the acts done by the 
Provisional Legislative Council to see whether it acted within the powers given 
to it by the Prepara to ry Commi t t ee . " C h e u n g Lai Wah v. Director of 
Immigrat ion, [1998] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 772, 780 (Ct. App. ) . 
^See Linda Choy, Self-Imposed Limits Could Sacrifice Autonomy, Law Academic 
Warns, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 7; Editorial, Provisional Verdict, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 16; Yash Ghai, Dark Days for Our Rights, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 16; Angela Li, Bar Chief Hits at a 
"Backward-Looking" Example in Provisional Legislature Case, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, July 30, 1997, at 6. For a sustained critical analysis of the j udgmen t , see 
Johannes Chan, The Jurisdiction and Legality of the Provisional Legislative Council, 27 
H.K. L.J. 374 (1997). 
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In general, although the Region's judges are constrained 
from exercising jurisdiction "over defence and foreign affairs"— 
as well as required to obtain an executive certificate on "questions 
of fact concerning acts of state whenever such questions arise in 
the adjudication of cases"10—they must preserve the judicial inde-
pendence bestowed on them in both the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration}1 and the Region's Basic Law.V2 Consequently, as elab-
orated by the former Attorney General of Hong Kong, J. F. 
Mathews,13 Special Administrative Region courts are empowered 
to "determine whether an act is or is not an act of state." Further, 
in accordance with the common law,14 they should construe "act 
of state" as pertaining to certain acts of the Executive, to be dis-
tinguished from an act by a legislative assembly (the National 
People's Congress). "The courts would not therefore be prohibit-
ed from adjudicating on the lawfulness of such a legislative act." 
Indeed, as Mathews concludes, "[i]f guarantees in the Basic Law 
could be overridden by decisions of the National People's 
Congress, and the courts of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region were powerless to question the legality of 
^See H o n g Kong Court of Final Appeal Ord inance , LAWS O F H O N G KONG 
Ch. 484, § 4. 
11Joint Declaration, People's Republic of China-Uni ted Kingdom, signed 
Dec. 19, 1984, Art. 3(3) , Annex I, § III. 
2
 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's 
Republic of China (Basic Law), adop ted on April 4, 1990, by the Seventh National 
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its Thi rd Session, reprint-
ed in 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1511 (1990). 
1 3J. F. Mathews, No Sound Legal Basis for Grim Scenario, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, April 18, 1997, at 18. 
1 4 T h e c o m m o n law is guaranteed to cont inue to apply in the F1KSAR u n d e r 
both the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Annex I, § II, and the Basic Law, Art. 8. See 
also YASH GHAI, H O N G KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: T H E RESUMPTION OF 
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 296 (1997) (". . . the general references 
to the 'previous jurisdiction of courts ' [Basic Law, Art. 19] as well as the contin-
uance of the c o m m o n law as the fundamental basis of the legal system of the 
HKSAR should be enough to ensure that the restrictions on the jurisdict ion of 
the courts u n d e r the doctr ine of the act of state are no more extensive than cus-
tomarily in the c o m m o n law. Nor is there any reason for the courts to hold that 
all acts of the Central Authorities that are carried out in H o n g Kong are immune 
from judicial scrutiny."). 
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those decisions, this would be a devastating blow to the rule of law 
and to confidence in Hong Kong's future."15 
Other ("from within") challenges to the territory's autonomy 
are thought to have been posed by the Region's prosecutorial 
authorities and its (provisional) legislators. Concerns have been 
raised in particular over what has been described as "incidents of 
selective 'non-prosecution',"16 namely, the decision by the Justice 
Department not to prosecute Sally Aw, a well-connected publish-
ing tycoon and member of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, despite being named in charges by the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) as involved 
(together with senior executives in her company, the Hong Kong 
Standard, a newspaper) in a conspiracy to defraud purchasers of 
advertising space.17 The Justice Department's decision followed 
another contentious decision not to initiate legal proceedings 
against the Xinhua News Agency, one of China's most important 
institutions in the territory, for a breach of the Personal Data 
(Privacy) Ordinance.18 
^ I t is fair to note that in the Ma Wai-Kwan case, the court held that the 
establishment of the Provisional Legislative Council was not in breach of the 
Basic Law, since "[the PLC] is, strictly speaking, not a legislative council u n d e r 
art. 68 of the Basic Law. It was no t a creation of the Basic Law . . . only an inter-
im body formed by the Preparat ion [sic] Commit tee u n d e r the authority and 
the powers of the NPC pursuant to the 1990 and 1994 NPC Decisions." [1997| 
H.K.L.R.D. at 776 (Ct. App.) (per Chan, C. J . ) . See also Cheung Lai Wah v. 
Director of Immigrat ion, [1998] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 772, 780 (Ct. App.) ! 
16
.S><? NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC: INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, T H E 
PROMISE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN H O N G KONG: AUTONOMY AND THE RULE OF LAW, 
(NDI H O N G KONG REPORT #3, May 1, 1998) ("NDI REPORT") . The Report cites 
these incidents and the lack of adequate public account by the Administration 
as examples of a "troubling lack of commi tmen t to the rule of law." NDI REPORT, 
supra at 15-16, 18. 
" J o h n Riddley, Hong Kong Drops Fraud Case Against Top Publisher, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 1998, at 4. 
^ T h e Agency had failed to respond within the required time (the legal 
deadl ine is 40 days; the Agency took 10 mon ths to reply) to a request by Emilv 
Lau, a former legislator and leader of the Frontier Party, for access to any per-
sonal files held on he r by the Agency. An ill-judged remark by Chief Executive 
Tung Chee-hwa that the violation by Xinhua was "a technical breach, not a sub-
stantial breach" has further fueled concerns over a piecemeal erosion of the rule 
of law in the SAR. See Editorial, Letter of the Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 
12, 1998, at 20. See also Yash Ghai, Praise is Not Enough, SUNDAY MORNING POST, 
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An even greater controversy has surrounded the enactment 
by the Provisional Legislature on the last day of its existence of the 
Adaptation of Laws (Interpretative Provisions) Ordinance. 1 9 This 
ordinance resulted in the transfer of exemption privileges from 
the "Crown" to the "State."20 "State" was defined to include the 
government of the Special Administrative Region and China's 
Central Authorities that exercise executive functions and func-
tions for which the Central Government has responsibility unde r 
the Basic Law. The term also includes subordinate organs of the 
Central Authorities that exercise executive functions on behalf of 
the Central Government and do not exercise commercial func-
tions. The government contends that the new law is a mere tech-
nical adaptation of colonial law language, designed to reflect 
H o n g Kong's status as part of China. Critics, however, have 
argued tha t—compounded by the loose definition of "State"21— 
a door has been opened to legal immunity for mainland bodies 
from the application of local law, contrary to the Basic Law.22 
Further, fears that a two-tier legal system would be created have 
Mar. 22, 1998 (pointing out that "the rule of law cannot survive without its prac-
tice, as it is demonstrated daily in the processes of government, litigation in the 
courts, and the observance of the law."). 
19Ordinance No. 26 of 1998, ORDINANCES OF THE HKSAR. 
2
°The new ordinance repealed Section 66 of the Interpretation and 
General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1) which provided that "No Ordinance shall in 
any manner whatsoever affect the right of or be binding on the Crown unless it 
is therein expressly provided or unless it appears by necessary implication that 
the Crown is bound thereby." (The "Crown" covered both the Hong Kong and 
the UK governments). The Section has now been replaced with the provision 
that "(1) No Ordinance (whether enacted before, on or after 1 July 1997) shall 
in any manner whatsoever affect the right of or be binding on the State unless 
it is therein expressly provided or unless it appears by necessary implication that 
the State is bound thereby." 
21As noted by one observer, "in sharp contrast to British rule—during 
which time bodies that could claim Crown immunity were few and well 
defined—the number of Chinese organizations that might now invoke State 
immunity are many and ill defined." Review Editorial, The Worm Turns. In Hong 
Kong a New Colonialism, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Apr. 23, 1998, at 86. 
22Article 22 of the Basic Law stipulates that "All offices set up in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region by departments of the Central 
Government, or by provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly 
under the Central Government, and the personnel of these offices shall abide by 
the laws of the Region." 
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not been assuaged by the Hong Kong administration's statement 
that "Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy is not undermined" 
because "it is H o n g Kong's legislature that must determine the 
extent to which it is appropriate for particular ordinances to bind 
[State organs]."2 3 
Indeed, as forcefully argued by constitutional law expert Yash 
Ghai, the new legislation, which is justified as a mere transfer to 
the new sovereign of privileges enjoyed by the Crown before July 
1, 1997, is based on the "mistaken assumption that Hong Kong is 
a colony of China."24 Ghai explains that while continuity might be 
one of the operating yardsticks in devising adaptation laws for the 
Special Administrative Region (for example, regarding the prin-
ciples and safeguards of the legal system, the market economy, 
and fiscal and tax policies), regarding the Special Administrative 
Region/Centra l Government relationship, "analogies with H o n g 
Kong's relationship with its colonial master are not only inappro-
priate but strike at the root of [the] Hong Kong constitutional sys-
tem."25 More specifically, 
[njothing in the Basic Law requires the exemption of the 
Special Administrative Region or national government from 
the application of laws. On the contrary, the Basic Law is con-
cerned to minimise the role of institutions of the central or 
provincial governments in the Special Administrative Region. 
They are not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Special 
Administrative Region; they need the Special Administrative 
Region's permission before they can be established here; and 
they have to abide by the laws of the Special Administrative 
Region (Article 22 ).26 
2
 Ian Wingfield, High Degree of Autonomy is Not Vndennined, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Apr. 15, 1998. Wingfield, the Acting Secretary of Justice, was 
responding to strong criticisms by the Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar 
Association, Audrey Eu, S.C., Government Failing to Faee Real Issues, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Apr. 10, 1998. 
24Yash Ghai, False Analogies, SUNDAY MORNING POST, Apr. 5, 1998. Ghai also 
questions the justification of the rule of Crown privilege itself (the origin of 
which, he says, lies in feudalism, when the monarch was the government) and 
suggests that "[i]t has no place in a modern state which is committed to the rule 
of law. Instead, the rule should be all laws bind the government (which needs to 
be defined narrowly) unless it is expressly and necessarily exempted from it." Id. 
&Id. 
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Internal Self-Determination 
One Hong Kong administration post-handover act that has 
aroused intense controversy was the change in the electoral 
arrangements for the May 1998 election of the first Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Legislative Council. Under the 
new law,27 modifications include the following: 
• Substitution regarding twenty directly elected geographical 
seats28 of the previous "first-past-the-post"29 system with a 
form of proportional representation,30 whereby seats are 
awarded according to the percentages of votes cast for the 
various political parties 
• Restructuring of the functional constituencies, thereby 
resulting in an effective reduction in the number of those 
eligible for the thirty seats elected by functional con-
stituencies from 1.15 million to 200,000 voters31 
• Election of the ten remaining seats by an election commit-
tee composed of 800 members32 operating a "block vote 
system" 
The voting arrangements triggered considerable criticism, 
which portrayed the new system as a "backward step on democra-
2 7The Legislative Council Ordinance 1997, LAWS O F HONG KONG Ch. 542. 
2 8The 60 members of the first HKSAR LEGCO were elected as follows: 20 
returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections; 30 returned 
by functional constituencies; and 10 returned by an election committee. 
2 9The winning candidate in each district secures the seat. 
3
"A "list voting system" operating under the "largest remainder" formula. 
3\jim Erickson & Law Siu-Lan, Mapping the Way Ahead, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 17, 
1997, at 22, 24. Note that under the previous arrangements the constituencies 
were very broadly constituted and voting was based on an individual as distinct 
from a corporate basis. 
3
-The committee is composed of members from four sectors: industrial, 
commercial, and financial; the professions; labor, social services, and religious; 
and members of the Provisional Legislative Council, Hong Kong deputies to the 
NPC, representatives of Hong Kong members of the NPC Political Consultative 
Conference, and representatives of district-based organizations. The election 
committee was formed by subsector elections, except for the ex officio members 
(members of the Provisional Legislative Council and the HK deputies to the 
NPC) and the religious subgroup, which nominated its election committee 
members. 
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cy." Specifically, critics contended that the democratic base of the 
electorate had been sharply reduced, thereby giving "overwhelm-
ing influence to about 186,000 elite voters, mainly senior business 
executives." They further claimed that proportional representa-
tion will dilute the overall strength of most popular pro-democ-
ratic parties in Hong Kong standing for election as fragmented 
political entities.33 
The Hong Kong administration, through Chief Secretary 
Anson Chan, has countered that "democracy has not been throt-
tled." Rather, the new rules "will set H o n g Kong firmly on the 
road to universal suffrage envisaged in the Basic Laiv."'^4 Secretary 
of Justice Elsie Leung pointed out that "[ t ]he reduction of the 
size of the electorate is a result of restoring functional con-
stituencies to their original purpose and nature. They were never 
intended to be a form of general franchise, but to ensure that cer-
tain important sectors within the community that have made sig-
nificant contributions are duly represented."3 5 And Secretary for 
Constitutional Affairs Michael Suen explained that "the propor-
tional representation system which is based on large [geographi-
cal] constituencies would be more conducive to continuity of the 
constituencies and provide more convenience for voters and can-
didates alike."36 He reiterated that "the election will be open, fair, 
honest, and acceptable to the public." 
Yet, regardless of whether these new arrangements are "only 
transitional" and "the ultimate aim is the election of all the mem-
bers of the LEGCO [Legislative Council] by universal suffrage,"37 
there appears no justification for a reversal of previous moves 
(themselves rather "small and belated"38) to expand the voting 
3 3 Rober t Stone & Esther Lam, Stifling Democracy in Hong Kong, INT' I , HERALD 
TRIB., Sept. 9, 1997, at 10. See also Editorial, Mixed Hong Kong Nexus, INT' I . HKRAI.D 
TRIB., Sept. 9, 1997, at 10; Editorial, Hong Kong's Retreat, INT'I . HERALD TRIB., Oct. 
4 -5 , 1997, at 10. 
™ Quoted in Chris Yeung & Rodger Lee, Anson Enters Poll Plan Row, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at 1. 
3 5Elsie Leung, Freedom of Speech Alive and Well, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Ang. 
29, 1997, at 21. 
3
 .S'CA Speaks on Electoral Arrangements, HKSAR Government Information 
Services, DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN, Aug. 12, 1997. 
3
' L e u n g , supra note 35. 
3 8 Chris t ine Loh, Not Far Enough, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Apr. 8, 1993, ai 
24. 
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franchise in the territory and broaden democratic initiatives. Nor 
are contentions that the earlier reforms were "illegal" grounded 
in any firm basis, given their full conformity with both the Sino-
British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.39 Some suggest that 
democracy in Hong Kong must develop in a gradual manner so 
as to maintain its social stability and economic vitality. Others say 
that the pace taken seems "prudent" when compared to democ-
ratic experiences of countries such as the United States.40 
Regardless, it is imperative that strong democratic institutions be 
allowed to mature in order to create a framework that is consis-
tent with the expectations of the international community41 
regarding the Hong Kong component of the "one country, two 
systems" approach. 
Human Rights Concerns 
The importance of protecting of civil liberties and basic freedoms 
for the preservation of the territory's international status needs 
little elaboration. Hence, it was reasonable to expect that moves 
to "roll back civil rights" in Hong Kong would provoke strong 
reaction both domestically and abroad. An example is the imple-
mentation of the decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress of February 23, 1997, to repeal or 
39See discussion in Mushkat, supra note 1, at 148-52. Left aside is the issue 
of compatibility of functional constituencies and differences among voters' elec-
toral rights (under the Basic Law) with international human rights law. See in 
this connection GHAI, supra note 14, at 226-29 
40See Michael DeGolyer, Historical Pointers, SUNDAY MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 
1997, at 10 (contending inter alia that "in some ways, Hong Kong is already 
democratically ahead of the U.S. For example, according to the U.S. 
Constitution, no president of the United States may be born outside the U.S." 
while "[a]nyone with sufficient residency can be chief executive in Hong 
Kong"). 
41It is interesting to note the caution issued by China's Vice-Premier Qian 
Qichen to the Preparatory Committee that its decision on the voting system 
must take into account the "concerns of the international community." Quoted 
in Danny Gittings, SUNDAY MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at 10 (the writer 
observed that heretofore matters of this type would have been considered as 
China's internal affairs and any foreign "concern" denounced as "interfer-
ence"). 
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amend certain Hong Kong ordinances, including the Bill of 
Rights Ordinance, the Societies Ordinance, and the Public Order 
Ordinance. 4 2 Post-handover concerns regarding the protection of 
civil liberties in the Region have followed the modification of the 
right of abode in Hong Kong of [mainland] Chinese children 
born to H o n g Kong permanent residents.43 The position taken by 
the Region's government, however, has been that the "legislation 
did not, in fact, deprive any eligible person of the right of abode 
in Hong Kong [but merely] provides a mechanism to ensure 
those who claim to have the relevant right of abode can have their 
claim properly verified before they seek entry into Hong Kong; 
[and that] pending determination of such putative status, the 
applicant remains outside the jurisdiction."44 Such a construction 
of the law has been given judicial approval by the Court of First 
Instance, which found no incompatibility between the curbs 
imposed on entry into Hong Kong of persons claiming the right 
of abode by descent and the Basic Law or the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance. 4 5 Nor was the retrospective nature of the legislation 
regarded as unconstitutional, since, according to the court's 
interpretation, the relevant r ight—guaranteed under Basic Law 
^^See Roda Mushkat, Scrapping Hong Kong Legislation: An Internationa! Law 
Perspective, 27 H.K. LJ . 12 (1997). See alsoYdsh Ghai, The Continuity of Laws and 
Legal Rights and Obligations in the SAR, 27 H.K. LJ . 136 (1997) (focusing on the 
misuse, for policy purposes, by the NPCSC of Art. 160 of the Basic Law to repeal 
laws that could no t be regarded as contrary to the Basic Law). 
• " U n d e r the Immigration (Amendment ) (No. 3) Ord inance 1997—enact-
ed on July 10, 1997, and given retrospective effect to July 1, 1997—a person's sta-
tus as a p e r m a n e n t resident of the HKSAR in accordance with the Schedule to 
the Immigrat ion (Amendment) (No. 2) Ord inance 1997 (including a person of 
Chinese nationality born outside H o n g Kong to a parent who is a pe rmanen t res-
ident of the HKSAR) can only be established by that person holding a "valid 
travel document" (i.e., a valid one-way exit permit issued by the Chinese author-
ities) affixed to which is a valid "Certificate of Enti t lement to the Right of Abode 
in the HKSAR" issued by the Director of Immigrat ion. Thus , mainland Chinese 
claimants who are already in H o n g Kong would not be allowed to apply for and 
obtain a p e r m a n e n t identity card or an HKSAR passport. 
4 4 L e u n g , supra note 35. 
4 S C h e u n g Lai Wah v. Director of Immigrat ion, [1997] 3 H.K.C. 64 (dis-
missing application for judicial review in four test cases). T h e determinat ion that 
Ord inance No. 3 is "constitutional" was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal on 
April 2, 1998, in Civil Appeal Nos. 203, 216, 217, 218 of 1997, Cheung Lai Wah 
v. Director of Immigrat ion, [1998] 1 H.KL.R.D 772 (Ct. App. ) . 
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Article 24—had already been "qualified" by another provision 
therein [Article 22(3)] . 4 6 
It may nonetheless be argued that the court erred in adopt-
ing an overly restrictive approach to justify the curtailment of a 
fundamental right that is enshrined in the Region's constitution, 
while at the same time generously interpreting legislation aimed 
at regulating the influx of immigrants. Specifically, the court 
appears to have misapplied an article designed to maintain the 
Region's autonomy (by disallowing unrestricted entry into the ter-
ritory) to "sanction a derogation" from the rights of the Region's 
residents.47 Some further contend that the ruling reflected defer-
ence to the government 's j udgmen t about public interest over a 
right guaranteed in the Basic Law and raised concerns regarding 
the "ability or willingness of Hong Kong courts to ensure respect 
for the rights established by the Basic Lam"4 8 Yet another com-
46[1997] 3 H.K.C. at 88. Article 22(4) provides that "[f]or entry into the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China 
must apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the 
Region for the purpose of settlement shall be determined by the competent 
authorities of the Central People's Government after consulting the government 
of the Region." On appeal, two members of the Court of Appeal (Nazareth, V-P, 
& Mortimer, V-P) agreed with the trial judge's conclusion that the retrospective 
provision in Ordinance No. 3 was valid, while one member (Hon Chan, C.J.) 
held the retrospective provision invalid since it sought to have the "effect of cur-
tailing or even taking away the right of abode conferred under Article 24(3) of 
the Basic Law." According to Chief Judge Chan, the provision was also invalid as 
being contrary to Article 12 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which 
prohibits legislation that exposes persons to the possibility of prosecution for 
conduct that was not criminal at the time of the conduct). 
47See Eric Cheung, Undermining Our Rights and Autonomy, 27 H.K. L.J. 297 
(1997). 
48See NDI REPORT, supra note 16, at 13. In a related context, SAR judges 
have been urged to show more "compassion" [see Editorial, Legal Compassion, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, May 21, 1998, at 18], after a decision by the Court of 
Appeal, holding that Article 24(3) of the Basic Law (which sets out the categories 
of persons entitled to the status of "permanent residents of the HKSAR") "is 
intended to benefit persons who were born to parents who have already 
acquired permanent resident status in Hong Kong rather than those who were 
born to parents who may subsequently acquire permanent resident status at 
some later stage." Hence, the words "if the parent had the right of abode in 
Hong Kong at the time of the birth of the person" (in f 2(c) of Schedule I of 
the Immigration Ordinance) are not inconsistent with Article 24(3) of the Basic 
Law nor contrary to Article 23(1 )of the ICCPR (given that the decision of the 
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mentator suggested that what is perhaps more worrisome in this 
context is the government 's offer of an out-of-court settlement in 
the previous cases. "The Government 's lifting of the children's 
removal orders in exchange for their withdrawal of the judicial 
review applications for their right to stay is seen as a kind of 
administrative expedience to avoid a potentially disastrous legal 
challenge, thus casting doubts on the Government 's will to 
uphold the rule of law."49 
Concluding Remarks 
Post-1997 Hong Kong thus appears to be evolving in a manner 
somewhat inconsistent with expectations that prevailed prior to 
the handover. China has so far displayed a truly remarkable 
degree of self-restraint, refraining from any statement or action 
that might be construed as an infringement on Hong Kong 
autonomy. By contrast, local decision makers can be said to have 
departed in several domains from the letter and spirit of interna-
tional and constitutional legal documents pertaining to the 
post-1997 configuration. Although the departures have not been 
radical in nature, there is a discernible trend away from a strict 
interpretation of the rule of law. These are early days and one is 
inclined to give the new key figures in various branches of the gov-
ernment , when confronting new challenges, some benefit of the 
doubt. However, the t rend should be closely monitored with a 
view to establishing whether it is a product of deliberate policy 
and is becoming firmly entrenched. 
permanent resident to split from his children and family is "by his own choice"). 
Chan Kam Nga v. Director of Immigration, [1998] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 752 (Ct. App.). 
49Fanny Wong, Let's Prove Wei Wrong on the SAR, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Nov. 26, 1997, at 29 (observing "signs of some disturbing changes reflecting 
Hong Kong's adoption of mainland practices and attitudes"). 
